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The Role of the Judiciary in Alien Admissions 
by Mark Gibney* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
By now, the proposition that courts help to make public policy comes as no 
surprise to lawyers and political scientists.! One of the landmark decisions by the 
Supreme Court, Brown v. Board of Education ,2 made this clear thirty years ago. 
The proper extent of judicial policymaking is still debated, for example, the 
propriety of Judge Garrity's role in desegregating the Boston school system,3 or 
Judge Johnson'S active voice with regard to the administration of the Alabama 
prison system. 4 Nevertheless, the proposition that we have a system of shared 
powers in which the judiciary is an active partner is commonly accepted. 
More noteworthy, then, are situations in which the courts do not play an active 
role in making policy. This article examines such a phenomenon, focusing on the 
role courts have played in immigration law, particularly alien admissions. The 
first section of this article looks at the courts' deference in the area of normal 
flow, or what might also be termed non-refugee, alien admissions. This is 
"immigration" in the widest sense. Since 1965, the United States has followed 
this avenue of admissions to implement a policy based largely on reuniting 
families. 5 The second section of the article looks at refugee admissions.6 In both 
areas the courts have deferred to the political branches, particularly in non-
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Purdue University; J.D., Villanova University; Ph.D .• 
University of Michigan. 
1. See glmerally D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND 
RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb ed. 1982). 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3. See glmerally J. Ross & W. BERG, I RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITH THE JUDGE'S ORDER: THE BOSTON 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONTROVERSY (1981). 
4. See A. NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT, chap. 11 (1982). 
5. Immigration and Naturalization Act [hereinafter cited as INA] § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1980). 
Approximately ninety-four percent of immigrants admitted to the United States have some kind of 
family connection. Immigration and Naturalization Service. Dept. of Justice. 1981 Statistical Yearbook 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Table 4, at 7. 
6. Most nations accept the definition of "refugee" in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, &/Jlmedfor signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. There, a refugee is defined as one who, 
"owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons ofrace, religion, nationality, membership 
ofa particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to 
avail himself of the protection of that country .... " In 1968, the United States became a signatory to the 
U.N. Protocol on Refugees. In 1980, U.S. law was amended to conform to the U.N. definition. Refugee 
Act of 1980 § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980). 
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refugee alien admissions. This article examines the stated rationales for this 
deference, and then questions whether continued deference is warranted under 
the de politicized alien admission system the United States has adopted. Special 
attention is given to the proposed provisions on judicial review of asylum claims 
in the Simpson/Mazzoli bill,7 Congress' latest attempt to tackle immigration 
reform. Apart from being a rare instance of in-depth Congressional examination 
of alien admission matters, Simpson/Mazzoli is of interest because of its resis-
tance to a more active judicial role in this area. 
Although the law of alien admissions is vital in its own right, it has larger 
implications for the role of the judiciary. Political and legal analysts should begin 
to frame a more comprehensive theory of what role the judicial branch might, or 
should, play in the growing area of domestic public policy problems that have 
international implications 8 This article questions why the courts readily remove 
themselves from policy areas that cut across the international and domestic 
spheres. 
II. NON-REFUCEE ALIEN QUESTIONS 
Decisions regarding foreign relations seem to severely test the premise that the 
federal government is made up of shared powers and a system of checks and 
balances. 9 Robert Johansen, one of the few political scientists to treat this subject, 
has written: 
Too many interests within the United States Executive branch, Con-
gress and thejudicial branch are all on the same (national) side of the 
global issues. Instead of the threefold separation of powers extant on 
domestic questions, there is a threefold concentration of mutually 
reinforcing powers on global issues. \0 
Johansen's remarks ring true, at least for the judiciary. Judicial deference, 
particularly noticeable in the area of alien admissions, has left the political 
branches with free rein. II Whether a more active judiciary would have helped to 
prevent our xenophobic past l2 is an academic, though interesting, proposition. 
7. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (passed in the Senate on May 18, 1983); H.R. 1510, 98th Congo 1st 
Sess. (passed in the House on June 20, 1984). This legislation eventually died in conference committee. 
8. The leading work in this area is L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ANn THE CONSTITU fION (1972), which 
supports the status quo of judicial deference. 
9. See The Federalist No. 51 O. Madison); U.S. CaNST. ARTS. I, II, III. 
10. R. JOHA"SE", THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE HUMA" INTEREST 381 (1980). See also A. MILLER, 
DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP (1981). 
II. One interesting piece of scholarship in this area is Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the 
Jurisdiction a/Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1952). Hart not only argues 
that courts should exercise more power in the immigration field, but also that courts already exercise 
more discretion than they give themselves credit for. 
12. Xenophobic is an appropriate term considering the tradition of excluding Asians from the 
United States, and the long-standing bias in favor of Northern Europeans under the national-origins 
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Peter Schuck has suggested that because Congress essentially shaped the legal 
dimensions of our national community, the end product displayed narrow 
parochial values. 13 Implicit in Schuck's argument is the idea that judicial in-
volvement might have brought about different results in our immigration sys-
tem. 
A. Judicial Deference 
By the late nineteenth century judicial deference in alien admissions matters 
was established. In the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case, 14 the Su preme Court refused 
to overturn a federal statute which excluded Chinese laborers from this country, 
despite the fact their exclusion was in direct contravention of the Burlingame 
Treaty of 1868 and the supplemental treaty of 1880. The Supreme Court relied 
on the rationale that a nation has an absolute right to control entry into its 
territory. This deference to the political branches continued in the 1893 case of 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 15 where Congress and the Court went a step 
farther and approved legislation requiring the removal of Chinese resident 
aliens from this country. The question in Fong involved a statute l6 that attempted 
to deport lawfully admitted Chinese aliens who had not obtained a certificate of 
residence bearing the signature of a credible white witness within one year after 
the act's passage. The Court upheld the act and set forth the judiciary's role this 
way: 
The question whether, and upon what conditions these aliens shall 
be permitted to remain within the United States being one to be 
determined by the political departments of the government, the 
judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the 
wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the measures enacted by Con-
gress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the Constitution 
over this subject. 17 
Nearly a century later the Court, in Fiallo v. Bell, was faced with the question of 
the validity of Congress' definition of a parent-child relationship, for immigra-
tion purposes. lg Under the Congressional standard, illegitimate children enjoyed 
quota system from 1921 to 1965. For a good discussion of past immigration practices, see Fuchs & 
Forbes, lmmigratian arul U.S. Histary - Tlui Evolulian of tlui open Society, SELECT CoMMISSION ON IMMIGRA-
TION AND REFU(;EE POLICY, U.S. IMMH;RATIO" POI.1CY AND THE NATIONAL I"TEREST 1981 [hereinafter 
cited as SELECT COMMISSION]. The landmark work in this area is J. HI(;HAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 
(1955). 
13. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I, 14 (1984). 
14. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
15. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
16. Act of May 5, 1892. "An act to pro!'ibit the coming of Chinese persons to the United States." 
17. Jd. at 731. 
18. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
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a parent-child relationship with their mothers, but not with their fathers. The 
Court employed language nearly identical to that in Fong to describe the judicial 
role. 19 
One of the more illustrative statements in this area, Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion in Galvan v. Press,2° shows dissatisfaction with the result, but also disin-
clination to steer the judiciary in a different direction: 
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as 
a limitation upon all powers of Congress ... much could be said for 
the view were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause 
qualifies the scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as 
belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of 
aliens. And since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so 
close to punishment for crime it might fairly be said also that the ex 
post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation, 
should be applied to deportation .... But the slate is not clean. As to 
the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not 
merely a page of history, but a whole volume. 21 
The Galvan case was decided only one week after the Court in Brown v. The 
Board of Education had wiped the slate clean in another area of the law. 22 In the 
area of alien admissions, however, the slate is apparently still cluttered with the 
residue of earlier cases. Examination is needed to see whether this clutter is still 
necessary. 
B. Explaining Judicial Deference 
At the base of judicial deference in alien admissions is the notion that the 
power to exclude aliens is given to the political branches. This power is nowhere 
explicitly stated. 23 Professors Martin and Aleinikoff have set forth three possible 
rationales for this unstated power to exclude. 24 First, examining the powers 
expressly given in the Constitution, the authors mention the following: the 
19. Id. at 792. 
At the outset it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial review inquiry into 
immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of 
aliens. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
20. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
2 J. Id. at 530-31 (citations omitted). It should be noted that, notwithstanding the above-quoted 
language, Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Jackson's powerful dissent in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206 (1953). See infra text accompanying note 56. 
22. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliensfrom Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. 
CT. REV. 275, 324. 
23. See Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
24. D. MARTIN & T. ALEINIKOFF, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY (West publishing forthcoming). 
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commerce power,25 the naturalization power,26 the war power,27 the migration 
and importation clause,28 the general welfare clause,29 the "foreign affairs" 
power,30 and the Tenth Amendment. 31 Martin and Aleinikoff then turn to a 
possible extraconstitutional rationale such as that used in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export. 32 Finally, no doubt unsatisfied by these rationales,33 the 
authors apply a rationale for exclusion based on the notion of national self-
preservation and self-definition. 34 In short, courts have a number of alternative 
propositions from which they may deduce that the political branches of the 
federal government have the power to exclude aliens, although it is not clear 
whether those propositions are well-founded. We are thus faced with a situation 
in which the power of the political branches to exclude aliens is perhaps suspect 
but which has nevertheless prompted an extra measure of judicial deference. 35 
Analysis of the problem is much more difficult because the courts themselves 
do not fully explain which rationale has led to their deference. Instead, the usual 
pattern is to employ boilerplate language found in cases decided over the past 
century.36 In fact, one might suppose that the lack of a solid foundation for the 
powers of the political branches in this area explains the courts' failure to 
provide a more searching analysis. 
C. Focusing on Foreign Affairs as a Rationale for Deference 
In a recent review of immigration law, Peter Schuck has attempted to explain 
25. Id. at 41. 
26. /d. at 43. 
27. Id. at 44. 
28. Id. 
29. /d. at 47. 
30. Id. at 48. 
31. Id. at 53. 
32. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). "The broad statement that the federal 
government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such 
implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically 
true only in respect of our internal affairs." Id. The Court reached this conclusion by arguing that 
before separation from Great Britain, the states in this country did not possess powers in the interna-
tional arena. This power was held exclusively under the crown and it passed directly to the national 
government after independence. Id. 
33. D. MARTIN & T. ALEINIKOFF, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY (West Publishing forthcoming) at 
45. 
34. Id. at 61. Michael Walzer writes: "the right to choose an admissions policy is ... not merely a 
matter of acting in the world, exercising sovereignty, and pursuing national interests. What is at stake 
here is the shape of the community that acts in the world, exercises sovereignty, and so on. Admission 
and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of 
self-determination." M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 61 (1983). 
35. For a criticism of judicial deference in this area, see Note,Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 1286, 1315 (1983) ("[N]o necessary connection exists between the conclusion that the 
power to exclude aliens is an inherent attribute of sovereignty and the further conclusion that both the 
judicial branch and the protective provisions of the Constitution are impotent in the exclusion setting."). 
36. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792. 
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judicial deference to the political branches in immigration matters.37 Surpris-
ingly, Schuck dismisses foreign policy and national security as possible rationales 
for judicial deference. 38 Instead, he argues that judicial deference is better 
explained by the idea that immigration matters represent basic questions of 
national unity and concern. 39 To ignore the Court's fear ofinterfering in foreign 
policy matters, however, is to overlook the most plausible explanation of judicial 
deference in the area of alien admissions. For example, in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy,40 a case upholding the deportation of several long-term U.S. resi-
dent aliens who had been Communist Party members decades before the depor-
tation action, the Supreme Court observed: 
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of 
government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the politi-
cal branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial 
inquiry or interferenceY 
In Fiallo v. Bell,4~ the petitioners attempted to distinguish the 1950s cases 
involving national security43 from the case at hand involving classifications of 
illegitimate children. The Court rejected this distinction,44 stating: 
We find no indication in our prior cases that the scope of judicial 
review is a function of the nature of the policy choice at issue. To the 
contrary, since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations 
with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must 
be defined in light of changing political and economic circumstances, 
such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to 
either the Legislature or the Executive than to the judiciary. 45 
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, in Baker v. Carr, 46 discussed the judiciary's 
role in the field of foreign relations: 
There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touch-
ing foreign relations are political questions. Not only does resolution 
37. Schuck, supra note 13, at 14-18. 
38. ld. at 17. 
39. /d. 
40. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
41. ld. at 588-89. 
42. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
43. In addition to Harisiades, see Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
44. It is noteworthy that Schuck uses Fiallo to support his argument that foreign relations consid-
erations do not explain judicial deference. Schuck, supra note 13, at 17 n.84. 
45. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 796 (citations omitted). 
46. 369 U.S. 186 (1961). 
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of such issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial applica-
tion, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed 
to the executive or legislative; but many such questions uniquely 
demand single-voiced statements of the Government's views. Yet it is 
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field 
seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular 
question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the 
political branches, or its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light 
of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible 
consequences of judicial actionY 
D. Critique of Judicial Deference 
1. "Political" Alien Admission Matters 
347 
There is a compelling logic to the petitioners' argument in Fiallo that only a 
distinct group of alien issues involves foreign relations questions. The Chinese 
Exclusion Case 48 is perhaps the most obvious example of matters of foreign 
relations permeating the entire political and historical setting in which the case 
was decided. In fact, the Court itself recounted at length the negotiations 
between China and the United States on the matter of admitting Chinese to the 
United States. 49 
These deeply embedded foreign relations concerns were also present in some 
of the Court's most noteworthy cases of the 1950's. For example, in Harisiades, 
Justice Jackson pointed to the political drama that served as background: 
There is no denying that as world convulsions have driven us to-
wards a closed society the expulsion power has been exercised with 
increasing severity, manifest in multiplication of grounds for depor-
tation, in expanding the subject classes from illegal entrants, and in 
greatly lengthening the period of residence after which one may be 
expelled. 50 
In a rather ominous tone Justice Jackson deals with some of these political 
considerations: 
Under the conditions which produced this Act, can we declare that 
congressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power without 
and Communist conspiracy within the United States is either a fan-
tasy or a pretense? This Act was approved by President Roosevelt 
June 28, 1940, when a world war was threatening to involve us, as 
47. [d. at 211·12 (citations omitted). 
48. 130 V.S. 581 (1889). 
49. [d. at 590·60 I. 
50. 342 V.S. at 588. 
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soon it did. Communists in the United States were exerting every 
effort to defeat and delay our preparations. Certainly no responsible 
American would say that there were then or are now no possible 
grounds on which Congress might believe that Communism in our 
midst are inimical to our society.51 
Two other landmark decisions of the McCarthy period, Knauf.f'2 and Mezei,53 
have obvious foreign relations implications. In Knauff, the petitioner, a Euro-
pean married to a naturalized U.S. citizen, was seeking entry into the United 
States for the first time. The Court addressed the question whether the Attorney 
General could exclude Knauff without a hearing, on the ground that her admis-
sion would be prejudicial to the United States. The Court, finding that the 
Attorney General's actions were legal, concluded: "whatever the procedure 
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned."54 The Court's harsh decision should be viewed within the frame-
work of the "national emergency"55 that existed when these procedures were 
adopted. 
In Mezei, a resident alien who had lived in the United States for twenty-five 
years, left the United States for nineteen months to care for his ailing mother. 
When he attempted to come back to the United States he was denied entrance 
without a hearing. As in Knauff, the Court in Mezei took some pains to place the 
case within the context of the Cold War, noting, for example, that Mezei's trip 
took him behind the "Iron Curtain."56 
David Martin has recently argued that immigration matters have political 
consequences for our international relations which courts are ill-equipped to 
considerY This position is supported by two cases that arose out of the Iranian 
hostage crisis. 58 The first, Malek-Maraban v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice,59 involved a federal regulation excluding Iranians from certain voluntary 
departure provisions. The second, Narenji v. Civiletti,60 dealt with the validity of 
singling out Iranian students in the United States for disparate registration 
requirements. 
There should be little doubt that both Narenji and Malek, as well as cases like 
51. ld. at 590. 
52. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
53. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
54. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544 (quoting Nishimura Ekie v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1891); Ludecke 
v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948». 
55. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546. 
56. Mez.ei, 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953). 
57. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. 
PITT. 1.. REV. 165,211 (1983). 
58. ld. at 211 n.169. 
59. 653 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981). 
60. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). 
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Mezei, Harisiades, Knauff, and the Chinese Exclusion Case, involve matters which 
might have some bearing on issues that could be loosely termed foreign rela-
tions. At times, immigration matters have profoundly influenced U.S. relations 
with other countries. For example, relations between Japan and the United 
States were severely strained after the exclusion of Japanese nationals under the 
"Gentleman's Agreement" of 1907.61 Using such an example, however, to sup-
port the general proposition that all alien admission questions are inextricably 
bound up with foreign relations is unwarranted. 62 
The possible foreign relations connection in cases like Fiallo is difficult to 
discern. 63 Another puzzling example of judicial deference occurred in Matthews 
v. Diaz. 64 In Diaz, the Court upheld a Medicare statute which differentiated 
between resident aliens who had lived in this country for more than five years 
and those who had not. 65 Oddly enough, in a companion case to Diaz, Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong,66 the Court explicitly rejected a foreign relations argument, 
albeit in a different context. In Mow Sun Wong the Court decided whether the 
INS could exclude aliens from Civil Service jobs absent express congressional or 
executive action to that effect. In this case, the Civil Service Commissioner had 
promulgated regulations in the belief that the President might use different 
treatment of various alien groups as a bargaining tool in foreign negotiations. In 
an uncharacteristic move the Supreme Court questioned the utility of such a rule 
promulgated by the Commissioner who had no apparent foreign relations au-
thority. The Court struck down this regulation, pointing out the severe impact 
such a regulation would have on an already disadvantaged class. 67 
2. The Depoliticization of Alien Admissions 
A better result in many of these cases would be a frank admission by the courts 
that the political nature of alien admissions has largely disappeared. The slate 
has in fact been cleaned, not by the courts but by the political branches. Looking 
61. See R. STORRY, JAPAN AND THE DECLINE OF THE WEST IN ASIA 1894-1943 128 (1979). 
62. In the recent case of Regan v. Wald, 282 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984), the Court considered the 
constitutionality of certain travel restrictions to Cuba. justice Rehnquist employed the familiar language 
of judicial deference to the political branches in matters of foreign affairs. Significantly, and perhaps 
unintentionally, justice Rehnquist also displayed an excellent grasp of foreign policy issues in his 
opinion. 
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
64. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). "Since decision in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign 
powers." Id. at 81. 
65. This statutory requirement had the bizarre effect of limiting participation in this program to 
those who were aliens by choice. Rosberg, supra note 22, at 285. 
66. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
67. Id. at 102. It should be noted that within a few months of the Court's decision President Ford 
issued an executive order barring aliens from employment in the civil service except "when necessary to 
promote the efficiency of the service in specific cases or for temporary appointments." Exec. Order No. 
11,935,41 Fed. Reg. 37,301 (1976). 
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at the entire field of alien admissions from ·the late nineteenth century until the 
present, the change is easily discerned. Until 1965, alien admissions were admit-
tedly saturated with political considerations. The Immigration Acts of 1921,68 
1924,69 and 195270 all sought to exclude certain races of people who were 
deemed undesirable by the political community of the United States. These were 
all political decisions, made by political actors, for decidedly political reasons.71 
Any court might very well hesitate to jump into this political thicket. 
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Harisiades exemplifies the kind of 
logic courts employ: 
Though as a matter of political outlook and economic need this 
country has traditionally welcomed aliens to come to its shores, it has 
done so exclusively as a matter of political outlook and national 
self-interest. This policy has been a political policy, belonging to the 
political branches of Government, wholly outside the concern and 
the competence of the judiciary. Accordingly, when this policy 
changed and the political and law-making branch of this Govern-
ment, the Congress, decided to restrict the right of immigration 
about seventy years ago, this Court thereupon and ever since has 
recognized that the determination of a selective and exclusionary 
immigration policy was for the Congress and not for thejudiciary.72 
To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, maintaining open borders and restricting 
immigration are both political decisions. It would follow from this logic that if 
- Congress passed a law stating that immigration was no longer a political area, 
which is what it has implicitly done, the Court could argue that this too was a 
political statement requiring a "hands off' approach. 
Beginning in 1965, with the abandonment of the national origins quota sys-
tem,73 Congress did much to depoliticize the entire area of alien admissions. 74 
Although the new seventh preference (for refugees) in that Act75 limited its 
scope to individuals who were fleeing from either Communist regimes or coun-
tries of the Middle East, the Act is better known for instituting a procedure 
68. Immigration Restriction Act, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921). 
69. World War Veterans' Act, ch. 320,43 Stat. 1068 (1924). 
70. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (amended by Immigration Act of 
1965). Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 91l (1965). 
71. For a good account of these acts, see Fuchs & Forbes, supra note 12. For an insightful discussion 
of political considerations in U.S. refugee policy, see H. MULLALY, UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY 
1789-1956 (1960). Mullaly gives a particularly good account of U.S. internal security concerns in the 
1953 Refugee Act. 
72. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 596. 
73. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 91l (1965). 
74. See A. SCHWARTZ, THE OPEN SOCIETY (1968) (describing President Kennedy's desire for an 
immigration system far removed from the political system of the past). 
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976) repealed by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (to 
be codified in scattered sections of 22 U .S.C. 8). 
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whereby people of all nationalities would be accorded the same treatment In 
gaining admission into the United States. 76 
Under the 1965 Act's policy of equal treatment, political considerations, in 
general, should be irrelevant. The government's argument in the 1976 case of 
Mow Sun Wong, suggesting the executive may make political decisions to treat 
certain nationals more favorably than others, is directly contrary to the law in 
effect since 1965. This is not to say that political considerations will never playa 
part in alien admissions. Narenji and Malek point to the contrary. However, 
Narenji and Malek should be recognized as exceptions. 77 Of course, it could be 
argued that Congress has the power to change the system once again. Perhaps 
U.S. citizens and their representatives will want to exclude Chinese nationals 
again,78 or perhaps they will feel uncoinfortable that the majority of aliens 
admitted to the United States are not caucasian. 79 Nevertheless, until alien 
admission decisions become political decisions once again, courts should not 
continue to act on the false premise that nothing has changed since the 
nineteenth century. In short, the political branches have signalled the judiciary 
that "politics as usual" was to end in 1965, but for some unexplained reasons the 
courts have generally maintained a pre-1965 level of review and analysis. 
This is not to argue that all political factors have been removed from non-
refugee alien admissions. The exclusion and deportation provisions80 may have 
traces of political factors, particularly in the "subversives" category.81 However, 
such provisions are not "political" in the same sense the past quota system was. 
Present-day exclusions do not single out any particular country the way the 
76. The one exception is that colonies are treated differently, with an allotment of 600 visas. INA § 
202(e), S U.S.C. § 1152(e) (1976). 
77. On a related theme, the court in Narenji stated, U[t]his court is not in a position to say what effect 
the required reporting by several thousand Iranian students who may be in this country illegally, will 
have on the attitude and conduct of the Iranian government." Narenji, 617 F.2d at 74S. Few members of 
the political branches, however, would possess such knowledge. It is less important that the courts 
become experts on foreign affairs than that they have some knowledge of the international events in 
question, and are alert that the political branches do not overstep constitutional or statutory bounds. 
7S. It should be pointed out that Congress' ability to systematically exclude nationals of another 
country is in some doubt. Rosberg argues that such a law could not be upheld in light of the interests 
that U.S. citizens have in seeing that their relatives are eligible for admission. Rosberg, supra note 22, at 
327. Henkin does not take a definite position, but questions who would have standing to challenge such 
a law. HENKIN, supra note S, at 25S. 
79. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, FINAL REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 96 (19SI). The six countries currently 
sending the largest numbers of legal aliens to the United States are China and Taiwan, Korea, Cuba, the 
Philippines, and Mexico. 
SO. INA § 212(a)(1-33), S U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1-33) (1976); INA § 241(a)(1-IS), S U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1-1S) 
(1976). 
SI. INA § 212(a)(2S-29), S U.S.C. § l1S2(a)(2S-29), excludes individuals who are anarchists or 
communists or who seek the overthrow of the U.S. government, and INA § 241(a)(6-7), S U.S.C. § 
1251(a)(6-7), makes anarchists and communists deportable. 
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pre-1965 system did.~2 The political branches have cast strong doubt on the 
political nature of most alien admissions.~3 
Another reason to question the judiciary's general hesitancy in alien admission 
matters is that in some instances the Supreme Court has taken an active role, 
although the Court's own logic would dictate continued deference. One such 
area of increased activism involves the "re-entry" doctrine. 84 
E. Judicial Activism in Related Areas 
1. The "Re-entry" Doctrine 
The 1933 case of Volpe v. Smith~5 provides an example of the Court's old 
deferential role in re-entry cases. A resident alien who had lived continuously in 
the United States for twenty-two years before making a "brief visit"~6 to Cuba was 
excluded when he attempted to return to the United States. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service's determination that 
this was a re-entry, and it upheld the exclusion of Volpe because he had 
committed a crime of moral turpitude: counterfeiting U.S. money, nineteen 
years after he originally came to the United States. It is interesting to note that, 
because the statute of limitations had passed for deportation, exclusion under 
the re-entry doctrine was the only way to effect Volpe's removal. 
In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,~7 the Court began to modify this stringent standard. In 
this case, the resident alien had entered the United States in 1952 and had 
remained in the United States except for one brief sojourn to Mexico that lasted 
a matter of hours. The question presented was whether this brief visit to Mexico 
and attempted re-entry into the United States constituted an "entry" for pur-
poses of the statute. The Court maintained that a more meaningful interruption 
of residence was necessary to meet the standards of the law.~~ 
A strongly worded dissenting opinion in Fleuti pointed out that precedent, the 
plain meaning of the statute, and legislative history, allied to the conclusion that 
82. Recently, the United States and Cuba reached an agreement under which more than 20,000 
Cubans are to enter the United States as normal flow immigrants. Schmidt, For Cubans Excluded, A Long 
Way Out - Or In, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, at 2E, col. 3. 
83. STAFF REPORT, DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE. LABOR AND STATE, U.S. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 23 (1979) ("[WJith the possible exception of Mexico. immigration is not normally a 
crucial issue in our bilateral relations with other countries."). 
84. In INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. 1l01(a)(13) (1976). "entry" is defined as "any coming of an alien 
into the United States ... except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States 
shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration 
laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or 
place or to an outlying possession was not intended by him or reasonably intended or reasonably to be 
expected by him." Id. 
85. 289 U.S. 422 (1933). 
86. Id. at 423. 
87. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). 
88. Id. at 460-62. 
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even such an innocuous trip and attempted return was an "entry." The dissent 
also pointed out that even the respondent himself did not question whether the 
return was an "entry."H9 
The Court has not stopped here. Last term, in the 1983 case of Landon v. 
Plasencia,90 the Supreme Court expanded the re-entry exception. Plasencia was a 
resident alien who had entered the United States in 1970. In 1975, she traveled 
to Mexico for several days and upon her return to the United States she was 
arrested attempting to smuggle illegal aliens. Although the Court stated that the 
proper action was an exclusion and not a deportation hearing,"! the Court 
introduced a new concept. By virtue of the respondent's previous residence in 
this country, the Court decided, she should be accorded certain due process 
rights. The case was remanded but the message to the lower courts seems clear: a 
narrower reading of "entry" is required for persons with past ties to this country. 
As in all other alien cases, the Court in Fleuti and Plasencia employed the boiler 
plate language of judicial deference. 92 However, in neither case did the Court 
playa passive role with respect to congressional intent. The rationale for the 
increased judicial role here is that a resident alien should be provided more due 
process rights than an alien seeking initial entry. Unfortunately, these cases fail 
to explain why the reasons for judicial deference in the initial entry cases do not 
compel judicial deference here. One might imagine that, to be consistent, the 
Court could ignore due process considerations and instead focus on the foreign 
relations concerns and the need to speak with a single national voice in re-entry 
cases. Obviously, the Court is no longer willing to take this approach, nor should 
it. The end result is deference and one set of criteria for some "entries," but 
much less deference and the application of other criteria for other "entries."93 
2. Deportation 
Another area of immigration law that is at times difficult to reconcile with the 
principle of judicial deference is the area of deportation. Deportation can be 
divided into two separate areas. As a procedural matter, aliens facing deporta-
tion have been afforded greater due process rights than aliens facing exclusion. 
The japanese Immigrant Case"4 established a standard of due process in deporta-
89. /d. at 464 (Clark. J., dissenting). 
90. 103 S.Ct. 321 (1982). 
91. Since the proper action was an exclusion, section 101(a)(l3) applied. /d. at 326-27. 
92. "Control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the 
executive and legislature." Plasencia, 103 S.Ct. at 330. "Congress unquestionably has the power to 
exclude all classes of undesirable aliens from this country, and the courts are charged with enforcing 
such exclusion when Congress has directed it." Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 461. 
93. Compare Martin, supra note 57, at 211 (arguing foreign relations concerns are so intertwined in 
immigration matters that courts should stay out). The author's point is that Martin espouses the idea 
that foreign relations questions dominate, but he conveniently ignores this argument when he frames 
his concentric circle theory of due process. 
94. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
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tion cases. The Court's opinion again noted the absolute right of the political 
branches to control the admission of aliens. The Court also maintained, how-
ever, that an alien who has entered the United States, and become a part of its 
jurisdiction and population, could not be deported without the right to be heard, 
even if the initial entry was illegal.95 This principle has been steadily expanded, 
often by the courts, over the course of this century.96 
Although the judiciary has accorded the political branches more deference in 
matters of substance, it has not remained silent. For example, in the area of 
deporting "subversives," the judiciary and the political branches have held a long 
discourse. In Kessler v. Strecker,97 the Court held that an alien who had become a 
member of the Communist Party after entering the United States, but who had 
left the Party prior to arrest, was not deportable under the 1918 Act.98 In 1940, 
Congress responded to Kessler by providing for deportation of any alien who had 
been a member of a subversive group "at any time" after entering the United 
States.99 The Court upheld this Act in HarisiadesYlO Congress extended this 
policy on subversives in the Subversive Activities Control Act in 1950. 101 This Act 
listed the Communist Party by name and made membership in or affiliation with 
the Party a basis for deportation. 102 The Court responded to the harshness of this 
standard by requiring a "meaningful association" with the Party. loa In short, 
there has been give and take between the branches of government in the 
deportation area, an exchange too often lacking in other areas of alien admis-
sions. Moreover, the Court has played an important part in the development of 
deportation policy. 
Another example of Supreme Court activism in deportation matters was 
exhibited in Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. l04 Woodby was a 
consolidation of two deportation cases. In both instances the burden of proof 
used in the administrative hearings was either not established, or it was "reason-
able, substantial and probative evidence."105 The Court reviewed the legislative 
history and concluded that the "reasonable, substantial and probative evidence" 
95. The Court's concern for due process in thejapanese Immigration Case has an unusual aspect, since 
the hearing provided was conducted in English, and was consequently incomprehensible to the plain-
tiff, who did not speak the language. 
96. See generally lA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.5·5.13 
(1982). 
97. 307 U.S. 22 (1939). On the question of the deportation of subversives, see T. ALEINIKOFF & D. 
MARTIN, supra note 24, at ch. 6. 
98. Id. at 30. 
99. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940). 
100. 342 U.S. at 596. 
101. Subversive Activities Control Act, ch. 1024,64 Stat. 987 (1950). 
102. Id. at ch. 1006, 1008. 
103. See Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957); Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 
469, 476-77 (1963). 
104. 385 U.S. 276 (1966). 
105. Id. at 279, 281. 
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language in the statute referred to the scope of judicial review, not the burden to 
be applied on the administrative level. 106 The Court went on to explain that 
Congress had not yet addressed the question of the degree of proof required at 
that level. 107 Finally, with an activism seldom displayed in this general area, the 
Court noted that questions of the burden of proof in administrative hearings are 
traditionally left with the judiciary. lOS 
The judicial branch has also taken an active role in the area of the suspension 
of deportation. In a per curiam opinion. 109 the Supreme Court admonished the 
circuit courts for substituting their own version of "extreme hardship" for that of 
the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals: IIO 
The crucial question in this case is what constitutes "extreme hard-
ship." These words are not self-explanatory, and reasonable men 
could easily differ as to their construction. But the Act commits their 
definition in the first instance to the Attorney General and his dele-
gates, and their construction and application of this standard should 
not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer 
another interpretation of the statute. 111 
Notwithstanding this reprimand, a number of lower federal courts have con-
tinued to engage in close scrutiny of denials of deportation suspension. 112 Again, 
what is noteworthy about these developments of the law is the judiciary'S active 
participation in making some aspects of immigration policy. 
F. Summary 
An overview of the judiciary'S role in non-refugee alien admission matters 
reveals not only a general deference to the political branches, but also some 
lOti. ld. at 282-84. 
107. ld. at 286. 
108. ld. at 284. 
109. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). 
110. The statutory language reads as follows: 
[T]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to 
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of any alien who applies 
to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and - (I) is deportable under any law 
of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has 
been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven 
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such 
period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation 
would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his 
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence. 
INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976). The activism displayed in this area might be better explained 
on the basis that claims for suspension of deportation are quite similar, and often made at the same 
time, as asylum claims. 
Ill. Wang, 450 U.S. at 144. 
112. See, e.g., Ravancho v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981); 
Reyes v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 673 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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judicial activism. Judicial deference exists primarily in matters of initial entry. 
The standard argument given for the judiciary's passive attitude is that immigra-
tion matters are inextricably intertwined with the making of foreign policy. This 
premise has been questioned here on the bases that: 1) alien admission policies 
have changed considerably since 1965 with the abandonment of the national 
origins quota system, 2) the considerations the Court paid deference to in cases 
like Fialla were not really "political," nor do they involve any question pertaining 
to foreign relations, and 3) the courts have taken an active role in other areas of 
alien admissions. 
The new principle that seems to be emerging is that the Court will be more 
sensitive to the resident alien's past ties with the United States 113 in determining 
what process is due. 114 Such considerations are indeed important. Yet it is 
difficult to reconcile that principle with the boiler plate language requiring 
courts to stay out of the entire area of immigration. 
What appears to be illogical is that "due process" considerations based on an 
alien's relationship with the United States do not prompt a greater judicial role in 
Fialla and Diaz situations. The Court could easily assent to whatever "connec-
tions" the political branches thought were necessary between the alien and the 
United States. The reason such a result is possible is that not enough thought has 
been given to the basic premise of judicial abdication in this area. The lack of 
foreign policy or foreign relations concerns in many immigration cases is gener-
ally disregarded. It is one thing to repeat the expression that the courts should 
remove themselves from issues of international concern; it is quite another to test 
this proposition in a searching analysis. In particular, not enough attention has 
been given to why immigration matters raise rather innocuous policy questions 
to issues having international implications. Moreover, the reasoning behind the 
courts' abtsention from any kind of involvement in matters of international 
concern needs to be seriously developed. 
The next section examines the courts' role in the area of refugee relief. This 
area has also been marked by instances of both judicial deference and judicial 
activism, although the trend seems to be going in the latter direction. 
III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN REFUGEE RELIEF 
For most of U.S. history no clear distinction was made between refugee 1 15 and 
non-refugee situations. Individuals either met the national criteria or they did 
113. The alien's future ties with the United States can also be quite important. In Plyler v. Doe, 102 
S.Ct. 2382 (1982), the Court struck down a Texas statute that excluded children of illegal aliens from 
public schools. At the base of the Court's opinion was the idea that these uneducated children might 
grow up to be nonfunctioning members of U.S. society. 
114. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S.Ct. 321,329 (1982). 
115. For a good discussion of U.S. refugee, asylum, and non-refoulement practice, and the close 
interrelationship of each, see Note, The Right to Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125 
(1980). It should be noted that these terms are sometimes interchangeable, although in this article they 
are distinguished when necessary. 
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not, regardless of their needs. 116 After World War II, however, there was a 
perceived need to admit refugees qua refugees. Since that time the United States 
has pursued a different admission policy solely for refugees, although it has 
done so in an ad hoc manner. Legislative attempts have often proven to be 
poorly designed for the exigencies of the day (The Displaced Persons Acts I17), or 
the future (The Refugee Act of 1980 1IH). In addition, refugee policy has been 
fragmented by repeated use of the Attorney General's parole power, 119 to admit 
large numbers of refugees. 120 Until recently the one constant in U.S. refugee 
policy has been the courts' hands-off approach. 121 The rationales employed are 
similar to those in the non-refugee alien area. The second section of this article 
focuses on the courts' role in the area of refugee relief. The author points out 
some changes in the practice of deference, examines whether such changes are 
needed, and argues for a more active judiciary. Essentially the argument is that 
the way the courts perform their vital governmental functions in other contexts 
should be the norm in the area of refugee relief. 
A. Detention 
One of the most direct challenges to executive authority has been the courts 
involvement in the mass detention of aliens claiming refugee status in the United 
States. Prior to 1954, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's policy was to 
detain all incoming aliens at the point of entry, pending a determination of 
admissibilityY2 From 1954 to 1981 the INS reversed this policy and paroled 
116. The most extreme example of this happened in 1939, when the U.S. Congress defeated a bill to 
rescue 20,000 children from Nazi Germany, despite the willingness of U.S. families to sponsor them, on 
the ground that the children would exceed the German quota. See Fuchs & Forbes, supra note 12, at 199. 
117. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647,62 Stat. 1009 as amended I:ry Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 
64 Stat. 219; Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167,65 Stat. 96 (repealed 1957). For an account of the ill designed, 
and arguably racist, admission standards for refugees after World War II, see L. DINNERSTEIN, AMERICA 
AND THE SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST (1982). 
118. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 109 (1980). The reference here is to the fact 
that only a few months after the signing of this act its provisions were ignored in order to deal with the 
Mariel freedom flights. See 126 CONGo REC. H4517 (daily ed. June 4, 1980)(statement of Rep. McClory). 
119. See generally Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865 (1982). 
120. Hungarian Freedom Fighters were admitted in the 1950s under this power, Cubans in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s (after the Refugee Act of 1980). Vietnamese were paroled into the United 
States in the mid- and late 1970s. See generally S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,5-6, reprinted in 
1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 141, 146. 
121. The best examples of this approach are found in § 243(h) cases such as Lenz V. INS, 379 F.2d 
536 (7th CiL 1967); Cheng Kai Fu V. INS, 386 F.2d 750 (2d CiL 1967); Khalil v. INS, 457 F.2d 1276 (9th 
CiL 1972). The old wording of § 243(h) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 
1253(h) was: "The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the 
United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on 
account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for 
such reason." The new § 243(h) removes this discretion from the Attorney General. See McMullen v. 
INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th CiL 1981); see also infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
122. For an overview ofiNS policy, see Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (II th CiL 1981), aff'd in part on 
rehearing, 727 F.2d 957 (lith CiL 1984)(en bane), cert. granted, 105 S.C!. 563 (1984). 
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aliens into this country, pending the admissibility determination. Reacting to a 
sharp upswing in illegal Caribbean migration, however, the INS resorted to a 
facsimile of its 1954 detention policy in 1981. 
The change between pre-1954 and post-1981 detention has not been in INS 
policy but in the courts' scrutiny of it. One noteworthy example of this new 
judicial scrutiny occurred in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith.'~3 This was a class action 
suit brought by a group of Salvadorans who claimed to be fleeing political 
persecution, torture, and death in El Salvador. The plaintiffs challenged a 
number of INS practices, including: 1) using coercive tactics to cause members of 
the class to accept "voluntary" departure, 2) failing to advise members of the 
class of their right to apply for political asylum and their right to a hearing prior 
to deportation, 3) denying counsel by refusing to recognize counsel's authority to 
revoke voluntary departure agreements and by limiting class members' access to 
counsel and legal information, and 4) placing detained class members into 
solitary confinement without first providing a hearing on the propriety of such 
punishment.'~4 
On all but the confinement issue, the court held in favor of the Salvadorans. 
The court severely criticized INS law enforcement and detention practices with 
regard to Salvadorans, and it set forth in great detail the manner in which the 
INS was to operate in the future with this group. 1~5 
An even stronger incursion into INS autonomy was allowed in Fernandez-Roque 
v. Smith.I~6 Fernandez-Roque involved the issue of continued incarceration of 
excludable aliens where immediate exclusion is not possible.'~7 Cubans who came 
to the United States as part of the Freedom Flotilla in 1980, but who had been 
incarcerated since the time of their arrival, challenged the government's action. 
The array of due process rights the court granted to this group of excludable 
aliens was wider than that enjoyed by deportable aliens, or even U.S. Citizens 
challenging revocation of parole after a criminal conviction.'~H 
Although not every jurisdiction is willing to go as far as Fernandez-Roque, I~fl the 
discernible trend is moving towards a much stronger judicial role involving 
detention matters. 130 One possible explanation for this is the courts' unwilling-
123. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
124. [d. at 357. 
125. [d. at 385-88. 
126. 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
127. Approximately 2,700 of the 125,000 Cubans who came to the United States in 1980 have been 
determined to be excludable. Efforts are now under way to return these individuals to Cuba. See 
Schmidt, For Cubans Excluded, A Way Out, N.Y. Times Dec. 6, 1984 at 2E, col. 3. 
128. Schuck, supra note 13, at 70-71. 
129. See Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1981),aff'd in part on rehearing, 727 F.2d 957 (1984), 
eert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 563 (1984). In this case, the 1981 detention policy was severely criticized but then 
reimposed on different legal grounds. See also Isktyaq v. Nelson, No. 82-2288 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 
1983). 
130. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). 
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ness to allow unconstitutional practices to occur within U.S. borders. 131 Unlike 
the claims of the overseas applicant for asylum or non-refugee admission, the 
claims of the alien incarcerated in the United States pose an American public 
policy problem that directly confronts all policymakers in this country, including 
the judiciary. 
B. Foreign Policy Challenges 
An even clearer indication of the judiciary'S changing role in the area of 
refugee relief is the fact that certain lower courts have not been intimidated by 
the need to pass judgment on some aspect of political life in another country. 
Although this phenomenon appears in recent federal court decisions, sound 
precedent existed for such judicial determinations of conditions in other coun-
tries. For example, the 1964 case of United States v. Esperdy 13~ involved a habeas 
corpus petition brought by a Haitian citizen who had been detained in the 
United States after a denial of a stay of deportation. The court relied on a series 
of New York Times articles on political conditions in Haiti to sustain the writ, 
and overturn the denial of a stay of deportation. 133 Similarly, in Corio/an v. INS, 134 
the Fifth Circuit held that the claims of two Haitians, whom the INS was seeking 
to deport to Haiti, had not been adequately evaluated. 135 The court decided that 
the INS had not considered additional evidence, to wit, an Amnesty Interna-
tional report documenting widespread persecution in Haiti. 136 In United States v. 
Shaughnessy,137 the Second Circuit took judicial notice of persecutions by the 
Chinese government, 138 and overturned an INS denial of a stay of deportation to 
the People's Republic of China. 
Recent asylum cases have gone well beyond these few examples of judicial 
activism. For example, in Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 139 a district court in Califor-
nia admitted evidence concerning conditions in EI Salvador. The court decided 
that it could not evaluate the seriousness of the alleged injury without examining 
evidence on conditions in EI Salvador presented by both plaintiff and defen-
dant. 140 After examining a great deal of testimony, State Department reports, 
and findings by organizations like Amnesty International, the court in Orantes-
Hernandez concluded: 
131. This policy did not seem to matter in many of the Court's previous cases such as Mezei and 
Knauff. 
132. 234 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
133. ld. at 616-17. 
134. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). 
135. ld. at 1003. 
136. But see Fluerinor v. INS, 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978) (an Amnesty International report has no 
bearing on the individual petitioner'S claim). 
137. 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1955). 
138. !d. at 718. 
139. 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. i982). 
140. ld. at 355 n.4. 
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In short, the violent conditions in El Salvador are a matter of public 
record and are corroborated by all available accounts. The Court 
therefore believes that it can take judicial notice of the following facts 
without having to "second guess" the Executive Branch's analysis of 
events in El Salvador, as feared by defendants: (1) El Salvador is 
currently in the midst of a widespread civil war; (2) the continuing 
military actions by both government and insurgent forces create a 
substantial danger of violence to civilians residing in El Salvador; 
and (3) both government forces and guerrillas have been responsible 
for political persecution and human rights violations in the form of 
unexplained disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture, and mur-
der.141 
The judicial activism and the method of inquiry in Oranles-Hernandez had been 
adopted with even greater vigor by a federal district judge in Florida in Haitian 
Refugee Center v. Civiletti.142 Judge King begins his opinion by simply stating: 
"This case involves thousands of black Haitian nationals, the brutality of their 
government, and the prejudice of ours."143 The background for this case was the 
arrival of thousands of "boat people" from Haiti in 1980. The complaint alleged 
discrimination by the INS against Haitians, involving both their substantive 
claims to asylum and the procedure by which their claims were heard. After a 
long and critical review of INS procedures, the court ordered a halt to the 
expedited "Haitian program"144 for hearing asylum claims. 145 The court com-
pletely rejected the findings of a special State Department team that had re-
ported little oppression and persecution in Haiti. 146 The court did, however, rely 
on other State Department findings on conditions in Haiti. 147 The personal 
testimony of Haitians seemed to greatly influence Judge King in arriving at his 
finding of widespread persecution in Haiti. Judge King's opinion presents page 
after page of such testimony, which gave not only a moving account of conditions 
facing these individuals, but also a telling portrayal of Haitian life.14~ Judge 
141. [d. at 358. 
142. 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 
F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). 
143. 503 F. Supp. at 450. 
144. Fo~ an extended discussion of how Judge King perceived the "Haitian Program," see id. at 
510-32. 
145. [d. at 532. 
146. !d. at 482 ("The State Department Report stands out in stark contrast with all other evidence 
presented on the treatment of returnees."). 
147. "Haiti has been accurately described as 'the most oppressive regime in the hemisphere'." Ox 25 
at 10 (quoting Jerry DeSantillana, State Department Country Officer for Haiti); accord Ox 74 at Tab E 
(International Commission of Jurists), THE REVIEW 3 (Dec. 1977) ("the most ruthless and oppressive 
regime in the world"). [d. at 475. 
148. Judge King's opinion is replete with such testimony. The following is an example: 
[My husband) was working at Customs in Port-au-Prince, .... He kept telling me that they 
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King's findings of fact went so far as to describe political, economic, and social 
conditions in Haiti, as well as the regime's motives. 149 
Much of Haiti's poverty is a result of Duvalier's [Dictator, or 
President for Life, Fran~ois "Baby Doc" Duvalier] efforts to maintain 
power. Indeed it could be said that Duvalier has made his country 
weak so that he could be strong. To broadly classify all of the class of 
plaintiffs as "economic refugees," as has been repeatedly done, is 
therefore somewhat callous. Their economic situation is a political 
condition. 150 
Judge King's scorn for governmental activities was by no means restricted to the 
political branches, U.S. or Haitian. The judge also castigated his brothers and 
sisters on the bench who, he argued, went to great lengths to avoid examining 
readily available evidence on political and social conditions in Haiti. 151 
The Fifth Circuit modified the lower court's holding, pointing out that: 
The evidence concerning conditions in Haiti was relevant and ad-
missible only for a limited purpose of showing the scope of evidence 
available to the plaintiffs to support their asylum claims and thus of 
corroborating the plaintiff's due process contention that the acceler-
ated program [for asylum hearings] made it impossible for them to 
submit and substantiate their applications. We agree with the gov-
ernment, however, that the district judge exceeded his authority to 
the extent he implied by his findings a conclusion that the plaintiff's 
claims of fear of persecution merited the granting of asylum. 152 
were talking to him about politics, that he should join the Ton Tons Macoutes [Haiti's version 
of a secret police organization). ... In '75 at midnight he left work .... Night had come and it 
was time to go to bed. They came and got him, the Ton Tons Macoutes came and took him 
away .... They left with him. They took him on Wednesday night. Thursday at 1 o'clock I went 
to Fort Dimanche. I went to the police station .... They told me they knew of no such person. I 
knew that if he was not released, he would be killed. So I didn't go anymore. I never saw 
him .... My son [was] in school. He was finishing up. He was complaining while he was in 
school. He kept complaining that if his father was still alive, his mother would not suffer so 
much and go through such misery .... He was complaining that if his father was there, and 
that the Ton Tons Macoutes took his father away. They took him. His schoolmates came and 
told me that they had picked him up at school. ... I started screaming, saying that they child's 
father had died. They took my child away from me. The next day three Macoutes came and 
arrested me. They started knocking on the door. ... They didn't allow me to speak. They took 
me and stuck me in a dungeon. They took me before the Chief of the Ton Tons Macoutes ... 
When I got there, he asked me what was wrong with me, what was my problem that I was 
screaming at the top of my lungs like that .... He said okay, and then he would send me home 
if I would shut my mouth and never wanted to hear anything out of me .... Well, if I did not 
shut my mouth, I would have gone the same way my child went. ... I could not go selling 
anymore because I was scared. I did not have a husband or child. I was scared. I stayed there 
and spent a month. After a month, I saw I could no longer live. 
Record at 1219-27, Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 475-76 (testimony of Augusta Germain). 
149. Compare Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 157 n.3 (3d Cir. 1976) (court relied on adminis-
trative record in order to affirm the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile). 
150. 503 F. Supp. at 509. 
151. [d. at 462 n.39 (citing Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1975». 
152. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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It is unclear what direction lower federal courts will take on alien admission 
decisions, particularly in the volatile~ area of refugee relief. The Fifth Circuit's 
opinion in Haitian Refugee Center might prove to be the death knell for increased 
lower court activism. It is more likely, however, that the Fifth Circuit only felt 
itself obliged to temper the extreme activism of Judge King's opinion. In addi-
tion, it seems likely that courts inclined to activism will accept the Fifth Circuit's 
agreement that the evidence of conditions in Haiti had some purpose, as a veiled 
invitation. For example, the court in Orantes-Hernandez 153 used the language of 
the Fifth Circuit's opinion 154 in accepting similar kinds of testimony by those 
seeking asylum. 155 
C. The Political Branches 
Several rationales are given for judicial deference in the area of refugee relief. 
One is that courts lack the resources to determine the merits of the claims before 
them. A more telling argument is that courts lack expertise in the field of foreign 
relations. l56 These arguments presume, however, that federal judges are out-
matched in resources and expertise by the political branches. 
The expertise question is difficult. The INS, which makes the final determina-
tion on admissibility, is a domestic federal agency without any apparent foreign 
relations authority or expertise. As a result, the INS relies heavily on reports 
furnished by the State Department. 157 In Zamora v. INS, 158 Judge Friendly at-
tacked the practice of admitting State Department reports on the basis that they 
contained little useful information. 159 By any account, the amount of informa-
tion to be garnered from the State Department's conclusory statement 160 stands 
in marked contrast to the information elicited in a case such as Haitian Refugee 
153. Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
154. [d. at 355-56 nA. 
155. [d. at 356-58. 
156. The judiciary has also been criticized for not possessing the requisite expertise in such public 
policy areas as desegregation, criminal justice, and reapportionment. See generally Lamb, Judicial Re-
straints on the Supreme Court, in S. LAMB & C. HALPERN, supra note I. 
157. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1983). But see Hosseinmardi v. INS, 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968)(defect in State 
Department report was not fatal because the BIA had reached its decision on the insufficiency of 
petitioner's evidence and not the State Department report). 
158. 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976). 
159. [d. at 1063. 
160. Judge Friendly's opinion quoted the State Department: 
[The Department believed] that the Zamora family would be able to live in the Philippines at 
this time free of restraints other than those imposed on all Philippine citizens .... On the basis 
of the information thus far submitted, [the Department was] unable to conclude that the 
Zamora family should be exempted from regular immigration procedures on the grounds that 
they would suffer persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, public opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group should they return to the Philippines. 
534 F.2d at 1057 (insertions in original). See also Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Godbold, quoting telegram from the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs to 
Immigration Judge). 
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Center. In fact, the INS staff is frustrated with the inadequate information 
provided by the State Department. 161 In Hotel & Restaurant Emp. Union v. 
Smith,162 the petitioners argued that the State Department advisory opinion 
process was defective because those who review such applications lack the neces-
sary expertise on conditions in EI Salvador. The court responded, not by defend-
ing the expertise of such officials, but by pointing out that such expertise is not 
necessary in making such determinations. 163 It is ironic that one rationale for 
judicial deference in the area of alien admissions is this very argument that 
courts lack the expertise of the political branches. 
The question of resources is also unclear. For example, one commentator has 
pointed out the severe manpower shortages that exist in the Bureau of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. 164 This might help explain the lack of sub-
stance in the State Department reports of which Judge Friendly spoke. 
The question that needs to be addressed is how much expertise in foreign 
relations the judiciary needs in order to play an intelligent role in refugee relief 
matters. The answer that seems to be emerging is that some judges are willing to 
look at a great variety of evidence to discern general political and social condi-
tions in a given country. To find widespread violence in EI Salvador, for exam-
ple, based on the fact that 40,000 civilians have died in the civil war in that 
country, would not take much expertise. What bothers the political branches is 
the fact that the courts' findings on conditions in other countries sometimes 
differ from the findings of the political branches. 165 At times, the courts and the 
State Department have reached different conclusions with regard to general 
conditions in certain countries. 166 For the most part, however, these conclusions 
have either come from conflicting evidence in the same general sources on which 
the State Department relies on or produces itself,167 or else from sources that 
many policy makers use, such as the New York Times and Amnesty Interna-
tional. In other instances, the basis for the court's conflicting decisions comes 
from evidence contained in individual testimony.l68 
D. Political Interference 
State Department reports have been criticized not only for their substantive 
inadequacies, but also for their bias. The common criticism leveled against them 
161. See INS STAFF STUDY, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, June 1982, reprinted in D. MARTIN & T. ALEINIKOFF, 
supra note 24, ch. 8, at 55. 
162. 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984). 
163. /d. at 513. 
164. Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618,628 (1981). 
165. Haitian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d at 474-510. 
166. Id. 
167. In Orantes-Hernandez, 541 F.Supp. at 357, the court stressed that the State Department itself 
found widespread killings in EI Salvador. 
168. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez, 541 F. Supp. at 356-58; Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d at 202-03 (Godbold,]., 
dissenting). 
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charges that U.S. foreign policy goals overwhelm objective fact finding. 169 The 
criticism is well-founded. Elliot Abrams gives a frank description of how asylum 
applications are handled in the State Department: 
Each application is reviewed individually by an officer in the Office 
of Asylum Affairs of HA [Bureau of Human Rights and Humanita-
rian Affairs] and then is sent to the appropriate country desk officer 
in the Department. If appropriate, HA may request an opinion from 
the Office of the Legal Adviser or information from the U.S. Em-
bassy in the applicant's country of nationality, or if appropriate, in a 
third country. After agreement is reached between the asylum officer in 
HA and the desk officer on the proposed recommendation to INS, 
the draft advisory opinion and applications file are reviewed by the 
Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs in HA, and in some cases by 
the geographic officer in HA or by the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Asylum and Humanitarian Affairs. 170 
From this account, foreign policy objectives seem to have an institutionalized 
bias in the system. The U.S. Select Commission has advocated changing the 
system to make such country reports the responsibility of the U.S. Coordinator 
for Refugee Affairs. 171 The Simpson/Mazzoli legislation shows a split between 
the two houses of Congress. Both the House and Senate versions would institute 
a policy of having specially trained administrative law judges do what Immigra-
tion Judges now do. 172 The House version of "special training" would be far-
ranging, including detailed knowledge of the 1980 Refugee Act, State Depart-
ment country reports on human rights conditions, the U.N. handbook on re-
fugee processing, and any other reputable source of "refugee or asylum infor-
mation."173 The Senate version, on the other hand, makes no provision for 
information other than that sent by the Secretary of State. 174 In short, the House 
version seeks to allow the new administrative law judges to consider several 
substantive sources in determining general conditions in other countries. In 
contrast, the Senate version would not allow the new administrative law judges to 
go beyond the bounds of the State Department's dictates. In the future we might 
well find the same kind of discrepancies that exist now in the conclusions of INS 
judges and federal district and appellate court judges who are using different 
data bases. 
169. See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 243, 253-54 (1984). 
170. Refugee Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Interna-
tional Law of the House Judiciary Committee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1983)(prepared statement of Elliot 
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) (emphasis added). 
171. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 79, at xlvi. 
172. H.R. REP. No. 115, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 115]; S. REP. 
No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 62]. 
173. H.R. REP. 115, supra note 172, at 57. 
174. § 208(a)(3)(B)(i), S. REP. No. 62, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1983). 
/ 
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E. Depoliticization of Refugee Admissions 
In the above discussion of normal flow alien admissions, it was pointed out that 
the political branches have gone to great lengths to depoliticize the entire field. 
An even stronger argument could be made that with the passage of the Refugee 
Act of 1980, the entire area of refugee admissions has become depoliticized as 
well. For example, the House Committee Report states: 
By changing the standard to refugees of "special humanitarian con-
cern" the Committee intends to emphasize that the plight of the 
refugees themselves, as opposed to national origins or political con-
siderations, should be paramount in determining which refugees are 
to be admitted to the United States. 175 
Professor Martin has argued that, notwithstanding the grandiose language in 
the Committee Reports and the Refugee Act itself, political considerations still 
pervade refugee concerns. 176 Martin points out that in 1977 a bill was introduced 
in Congress which would have made all refugees anywhere in the world equally 
eligible for U.S. resettlement, and yet this bill was soundly defeated. 177 Martin 
argues that the expressed concern with humanitarian values should be viewed 
within the context of other language in the report which shows that political 
concerns were paramount in framing this legislation. 17M The Refugee Act, he 
concludes, does not mandate choices divorced from foreign policy consid-
erations. He points to the fact that Section 207(b) specifically directs the adminis-
tration to report to Congress on the expected impact of refugee programs on 
U.S. foreign policy interests. 179 There is evidence that the State Department has 
not fully adapted to the new legislation. IBo Yearly admissions statistics also bear 
this out. 181 
The problem with Martin's position is that he allows the particulars of the Act 
to take precedence over the stated general purpose of the Act. Although the 
legislative history makes reference to criteria that might be viewed as maintain-
ing a quasi-"political" system,182 the Act taken as a whole shows that the "politi-
175. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979). 
176. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: 1ts Past and Future, 1982 MICH. V.B. INT'L L. STUD. 91. 
177. 1d. at 98. 
178. Id. at 105-06. 
179. !d. at 106. 
180. Posner & Kaplan, Who Should We Let In?, HUMAN RIGHTS 16, 19 (Summer 1981). Accord 
Kurzban, supra note 119, at 878-881. 
181. Although the Refugee Act was meant to expand the scope of refugee assistance beyond 
communist-noncommunist considerations, the same patterns have remained. For example, in fiscal year 
1981, the United States admitted 65,279 refugees from Vietnam, 11,151 from the Soviet Union, 38,194 
from Kampuchea, and 19,777 from Laos. In that same year, however, the United States admitted 827 
refugees from Hong Kong, 203 from Lebanon, and 243 from Greece. OHICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLE-
MENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 35 
Van. 31, 1983). See also, Helton, supra note 169 at 253-54. 
182. H.R. REP. 608, supra note 175, at 13: 
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cal" refugee policies of the past are to be abandoned. 1~3 Martin may also be trying 
to read political considerations into the Act where they do not exist. For exam-
ple, as noted earlier, Martin emphasizes the fact that the executive branch must 
report on the foreign policy impact of refugee programs. In the first consulta-
tion between the executive branch and the Congress, the complete exchange of 
information on the foreign policy implications of refugee admissions was con-
tained in this statement: "[t]he acceptance of refugees for resettlement in [sic] 
United States is of critical importance in furthering U.S. humanitarian as well as 
political and strategic objectives in the world."1~4 Foreign policy should, of 
course, be considered in some instances. Present policy, however, is dominated 
by political considerations to the same extent pre-1980 policy was. This state of 
affairs does not reflect a true reading of the Act. In fact, for practical purposes, 
the heavy emphasis on foreign policy concerns reads the Refugee Act out of 
existence. 1~5 
F. A Democratic Theory of the Courts' Proper Role 
1. The Refugee Act of 1980 
Courts should playa number of roles in the area of refugee relief. The most 
obvious role for the courts is to ensure that the purposes of the Refugee Act are 
carried out. Thus far a few lower federal courts have used the language in the 
Refugee Act to whittle away at the executive branch's discretion in implementing 
the Act. 186 For example, in McMullen v. INS, 1~7 the Ninth Circuit heard the case 
of a former Irish Republican Army informant threatened with deportation to 
the Republic of Ireland. The Ninth Circuit found that the new Act legislates the 
"substantial evidence" test for judicial review of the Attorney General's actions, 
rather than the less intrusive "abuse of discretion" test. I~~ Furthermore, the court 
[TJhe plight of the refugees, the pattern of human rights violations in the country of origin 
(including the extent of persecution to which they have been subjected and the severity of the 
present situation), family ties, historical, cultural or religious ties, the likelihood of finding 
sanctuary elsewhere, and previous contact with the United States Government, have all been 
legitimately employed for admission to this country. Further, the United States in the past has 
responded generously to refugees from countries with which we have been directly involved or 
with which we have treaty obligations. 
183. The Refugee Act is saturated with references to "humanitarian" concerns. Pub. L. 96-212, 94 
Stat. 102 (1980), § IOI(a) and (b); § 207(a)(I) and (a)(3); § 207(b); § 207(c)(I) and (3). 
184. Refugee Consultation for 1980, reprinted in 126 CONGo REC. S3960 (daily ed. Apr. 28, (980). 
185. Michael Teitelbaum argues that foreign policy gambits might cause large-scale refugee flows. 
He argues from a rather Machiavellian perspective that refugee flows can be, and have been, used to 
make foreign policy points, such as the migration from Cuba. See Teitelbaum, Immigration, Refugees and 
Foreign Policy, 38 INT'L ORG. 429 (1984). 
186. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez V. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 374-75 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Nunez v. 
Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 583-84 (S.D. Tex.), appeal denied, 692 F.2d 755; Louis V. Messner, 530 F. 
Supp. 924,927-28 (1981), modified, 532 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
187. 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981). 
188. Id. at 1316. 
\ 
.. '" 
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also accepted the argument that under the language of the 1980 Act the Attor-
ney General's power to deport was no longer discretionary. 189 On the basis of 
evidence of the petitioner's long standing political activities with various 
paramilitary organizations, the court found relief was wrongfully withheld. 190 
A number of rationales justify a more active role for the courts in ensuring 
that the intent behind the Refugee Act of 1980 is implemented. For example, 
there is some evidence that the legislative branch is unwilling to serve as a check 
on the executive branch. 191 As noted earlier, refugee admissions have continued 
to be overshadowed by East-West concerns. Another practice directly contrary to 
the legislative intent of the Act is the admission of individuals who do not meet 
the legislative standards for being considered a refugee. 192 Many of those admit-
ted from Southeast Asian camps are "economic migrants,"193 and there is also 
evidence that U.S. policy has worked to inhibit the entry of the poorer and "less 
desirable" individuals from these same cam ps. 194 In short, U.S. refugee admis-
sion policy, as implemented, has allowed the admissions of many individuals who 
are not truly refugees while it has worked to prevent the admission of many bona 
fide refugees. 195 The judicial branch should not passively observe this state of 
189. Id. See supra note 121. 
190. Id. at 1318. 
191. Congressional abdication in this area has been severely criticized. For example, Congressman 
Morhead observed, "[i]n passing this legislation, the Congress delegated almost absolute authority over 
refugees to the Executive branch. Let's make no mistake about it, according to the Refugee Act, the 
President can bring into the United States any number of refugees he wishes to admit." 126 CONGo REC. 
H4523 (daily ed. June 4, 1980). Similarly, Representative Butler's comments after the House-Senate 
conference had deleted a legislative veto provision over the number of refugees coming into the United 
States: "[t]he real issue to justify a legislative veto is because it would restore to the Congress of the 
United States control of the number of refugees and that is where the Constitution places it." 126 CONGo 
REC. HI519 (daily ed. Mar. 4,1980). Although the Refugee Act was intended to again involve Congress 
in refugee affairs, this has not occurred. "Consultation," see infra text accompanying note 203, seems to 
be a fairly routine affair as the Congress seems to accept the executive's directives as the status quo. 
Perhaps the most blatant example that the legislative branch will give the executive branch free reign 
was when the provisions of the Refugee Act were completely ignored by President Carter in the Mariel 
freedom flights in the spring of 1980. 
192. See Bach, The New Cuban Immigrants: Their Backgrounds and Prospects, MONTHLY LABOR REV. Oct. 
1980. Bach offers empirical evidence that with each wave of Cuban "refugees," economic motivations 
were at least as strong as political considerations in the desire to migrate. See also G. KELLY, FROM 
VIETNAM TO AMERICA (1977). Kelly's data shows how the first waves of Vietnamese "refugees" were 
admitted more often on the basis of their ties with the United States (such as employment with a U.S. 
corporation or the U.S. government), than on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution. 
193. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REFUGEE ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND EUROPE AND 
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BASED ON A FACT-FINDING 
TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND EUROPE, 97th. Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as REFUGEE 
ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA]' 
194. See Suhrke, Indo-chinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of Asylum, ANNALS May 1983. ("The 
refugees most likely to remain in the ASEAN States were the uneducated, the unskilled, the handicap-
ped - that is, those who would have the greatest difficulty in being accepted by third countries.") Id. at 
109. 
195. See REFUGEE ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 193, at 94. An interesting point in the 
separate report of Congressmen Hall and Danielson was the contrast between the rotund and wealthy 
"refugees" driving up to the refugee processing center in Geneva in well-stocked mobile homes, and the 
individuals languishing in Southeast Asian refugee camps. 
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affairs. 196 
Among the reasons why a more active judicial role in the area of refugee relief 
is desirable are: 1) Congress has passed refugee legislation which establishes 
certain criteria for the admission of refugees, 2) the Refugee Act of 1980 is a 
concerted effort to remove political considerations from refugee policy, 3) em-
pirical evidence suggests that the Act is not being implemented in accordance 
with its legislative intent, 4) Congress has little incentive to oversee the im-
plementation of the Act,I97 5) a few federal courts have shown that INS policies 
need careful scrutiny, and 6) many of these same courts have shown that judges 
will not necessarily be out of their element in cases involving some aspects of 
"foreign affairs." 
2. Moral and Legal Rights 
One of the fallacies dominating the area of refugee relief, which might also 
explain judicial deference, is that those seeking refugee status do not have any 
legal or moral claims against the United States. Accordingly, refugees are admit-
ted at the complete discretion of the U.S. government. 19S I have argued else-
where that many refugees have a prima facie moral claim to be admitted to the 
United States. 199 Professor Michael Walzer has argued in a similar vein that our 
greatest moral duty might be to those whom we have helped to turn into 
refugees. 2oo Furthermore, the provisions of the Refugee Act buttress the moral 
claim by adding a quasi-legal claim. 201 The question is whether the moral claim, 
196. The confrontation between the courts and the executive branch may sometimes be viewed as a 
simple conflict between the courts and lower level bureaucrats who are administering the law. See C. 
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77 (1969). 
197. See generally M. FIORINA, CONCRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); L. 
DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979). One conclusion to be drawn 
from such works is that when it does pay electoral dividends, legislative oversight will not occur. 
198. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Predrag Stevic, No. 82-973, 52 U.S.L.W. 4724 
(June 5, 1984). 
199. See Gibney, Seeking Sanctuary: A Special Duty for the U.S.? COMMONWEAL May 18, 1984 at 295. 
There I argued on the basis of justice as requital, that citizens of certain countries have moral claims and 
quasi rights against the United States because of U.S. foreign policy gambits in these other countries. 
Though the example used is El Salvador, the principle can be extended to countries such as Vietnam. 
[d. 
200. Walzer, supra note 34 at 49. 
Toward some refugees, we may well have obligations of the same sort that we have toward 
fellow nationals. This is obviously the case with regard to any group of people who we have 
helped turn into refugees. The injury we have done makes for an affinity between us; thus 
Vietnamese refugees had, in a moral sense, been effectively Americanized even before they 
arrived on these shores. 
201. The strongest ground for arguing that individuals seeking refugee status have no legal claim is 
that the Refugee Act speaks of the Attorney General using "discretion." § 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(a) (1982) reads: 
The alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney 
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A). 
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combined with the quasi-legal claim, gives rise to a claim that should be recog-
nized by U.S. courts. 202 
An interesting counterargument would suggest that after "consultation"203 
between the executive and Congress, the challenged action would fall into the 
first zone described by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure case. 204 As Jackson 
argued, in such cases the executive branch is on its firmest ground, and courts 
should be particularly reluctant to interfere with the executive's policymaking. 205 
Therefore, it may be contended, after consultation, that the President and 
Congress have reached agreement not only on the number of refugees to be 
admitted, but also that those to be admitted are bona fide refugees. In short, it 
might be argued, the courts should not interfere. A joint Congressional-Presi-
dential findingg that the United States should admit a certain number of re-
fugees, however, actually says nothing about the legitimacy of each individual's 
claim. Therefore, the mere existence of the consultation process should not 
cause a court to be any more wary of interfering. 
A final point to consider is that domestic courts might, by default, have to carry 
the burden of upholding standards of international law. Richard Falk has es-
poused this position.206 Falk points out that political considerations often hold 
sway over principles of international law, and he takes a very realistic view that 
the burden of upholding general principles of international law will, of necessity, 
fall on unbiased domestic courts. 207 
3. The Courts Role as a Check on the Political Branches 
Judge Friendly's opinion in Zamora v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 208 
highlights another problem for courts in the area of refugee relief. In Zamora, 
Judge Friendly noted with concern that the great weight the INS accorded to the 
State Department's recommendations deprived the INS of its adjudicatory and 
Despite this language, the Attorney General does not have free reign. The Attorney General is bound 
by the statutory definition of 1101(a)(42)(A) and the legislative history of the Refugee Act, which 
stipulates that the plight of the refugee is to take precedence over political considerations. See supra text 
accompanying note 175. Furthermore, much, if not all, of the Attorney General's discretion is removed 
under the new language of § 243(h) in the Refugee Act of 1980. See supra note 121. In the Supreme 
Court's recent holding in Pedrag Stevic, supra note 198, the mandatory provisions of 243(h) were 
underscored. 
202. One immediate problem is that some courts would simply choose not to hear such cases. See, e.g., 
Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court in Pena expressed disapproval of this 
judicial practice, but nonetheless felt bound by precedent. See also Note,Judicial Review of Visa Denials: 
Reexamining Consular Nonreviewability, 52 N.Y.V. L. REV. 1137, 1158 (1977). 
203. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 207(d), 8 V.S.C. § 1157(d) (1982). 
204. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 V.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,]., concurring). 
205. [d. at 635-37. 
206. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964). 
207. For a recent example of this, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d CiT. 1980). 
208. 534 F.2d 1055 (2d CiT. 1976). 
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administrative role. 209 Implicit in Judge Friendly's remarks is the idea that such 
recommendations similarly deprive the judiciary of its traditional role, when 
such cases come under judicial scrutiny. In an extreme case where the courts did 
not act in their traditional role, Shaughnessy v. Mezei,210 a former resident alien 
was excluded from re-entering the United States although neither Mezei, nor 
any of the courts, including the Supreme Court, were ever informed of the 
evidence against him.211 
Judge King pointed out the difficult position the judiciary has been forced to 
play in the asylum area. 212 By statute, judges are to review whether the district 
director has arbitrarily or capriciously denied an applicant's asylum claim. In 
order to understand the evidence before the district director, Judge King stated, 
the reviewing judge must have some grasp of the general conditions in the other 
country involved.213 Judge King asked rhetorically how ajudge could review the 
district director's decision without some understanding of conditions in a coun-
try such as Haiti. 214 The political question doctrine, the judge noted, is founded 
on the judiciary's refusal to interfere with activities wholly committed to the 
political branches. Judge King read the statutory provisions for review of the 
district director's findings, however, as an express invitation to the judicial 
branch to participate in the process. 215 
In summary, in the area of refugee relief the judiciary is expected to operate 
under a different set of rules than it normally abides by. Evidence consists of 
conclusory statements from the State Department, which have first been cleared 
with the political actors in that agency. Other evidence, including the personal 
testimony of individuals, is accorded less weight. This description does not match 
the way our judiciary works, or should work. 
4. Individual Claims 
Judge King's opinion in Haitian Refugee Center exemplifies the roles courts 
should and should not assume in refugee cases. Although Judge King disagreed 
with the findings of the State Department, his disagreement should not give him 
license to assume the role of Secretary of State, as he seemed to do in his 
far-ranging conclusions concerning conditions in Haiti. 216 Some positive aspects 
of Judge King's opinion, however, should be underscored. For example, the 
209. Id. See also Carvajal-Munoz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 743 F.2d 562, 253-54 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
210. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). See text accompanying notes 53-56. 
211. 345 U.S. at 209. 
212. Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 472. 
213. !d. 
214. Id. 
215. !d. at 473. 
216. See supra text accompanying note 150. 
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pages and pages of testimony by individual Haitians serves as a reminder that the 
court was faced there with individual claims.217 These portions of the opinion 
also highlight the fact that much can be learned from such personal testimony. 
Anonymous and widespread persecution is easily lost in the banality of its 
perpetuation. By focusing on individuals' accounts of how they have been 
treated, the court is directly confronted with the persecution in another country. 
Furthermore, a more reliable and complete picture of the political and social 
conditions in another country flows from such individual testimony.2lH While the 
State Department's much maligned reports take a top-down view, this kind of 
personal testimony offers a very insightful bottom-up version. 219 
It is by no means certain that the INS shares this view. For example, in 
McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,220 the court overturned a 
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals, because the Board had given 
little credence to the personal statements of the applicant for asylum. 221 The 
Board did not find that this applicant's statements lacked credibility; it found, 
simply, that such testimony is always self-serving. 222 This kind of reception for 
the personal statements of asylum applicants is consonant with the attitude that 
such statements serve no purpose and are virtually meaningless. In fact, one is 
tempted, as the court in McMullen must have been, to ask why such personal 
statements are taken if they are to be ignored by administrative agencies as 
merely self-serving. 
5. Alien Protection and Public Awareness 
Another important role of the courts is to increase public awareness of refugee 
admission questions. The Senate Committee Report for the Refugee Act stated: 
The bill, when enacted, is designed for the decades to come, and 
what refugees will be deemed of special concern to the American 
217. Haitian Refugee Center, 503 F. Supp. at 474-510. 
218. Judge King observed: 
In reaching its conclusions the court has listened to a wealth of in-court testimony, examined 
numerousdepOSltIOnS, and read hundreds of documentssubmitted by the parties. Much of the 
eVIdence IS both shockmg and brutal, populated by the ghosts of individual Haitians _ 
mcludmg those who have been returned from the United States - who have been beaten 
tortured and left to die in Haitian prisons. Much of the evidence is not brutal but simply callou~ 
- eVIdence that INS offiCIals decided to ship all Haitians back to Haiti simply because their 
contmued presence m the United States had become a problem. The manner in which INS 
treated the mor~ than 4,000 Haitian plaintiffs violated the Constitution, the immigration 
statutes, mternatlonal agreements, INS regulations and INS operating procedures. It must 
stop. 
/d. at 452. 
219. Judge Godbold's dissenting opinion in Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194,201 (5th Cir. 1975). also relied 
upon. and was obviously impressed with. the personal testimony of individual Haitians. 
220. 658 F.2d 1312. 1317 (9th Cir. 1981). 
22l. ld. 
222. ld. at 1317. 
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people will be a public policy issue that will be, as it is now, debated 
and reviewed continuously by Congress, the President and the Amer-
ican people. 223 
This kind of debate has not yet taken place. Instead of sound policymaking, one 
finds hyperbole;224 instead of serious debate on the merits of individual or group 
claims, one finds bureaucratic inertia. In Nunez v. Boldin,225 the court decided 
that, at a minimum, the asylum provisions in the 1980 Act give claimants a right 
to be heard. By scrutinizing asylum claims, the courts would also afford claim-
ants a broader public hearing than they generally receive now. 
Although this is not a traditional function of the courts, a great deal of political 
science literature on interest groups suggests that resource poor groups will 
often, out of necessity, turn to the courts for relief.226 This general trend in the 
area of asylum relief is particularly compelling.227 No natural constituency exists 
for asylum issues. Therefore, pluralist assumptions about the natural protection 
of interests completely break down here. 22s 
C. The Courts' Role More Specifically 
1. Martin and Aleinikoff 
Professors Martin and Aleinikoff recently have advanced some interesting 
ideas for different roles that courts should play in the area of alien affairs. 229 
223. SEN. REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1979). 
224. One instance of hyperbole is the insistence that asylum claims threaten to swamp the judicial 
branch. Alex Aleinikofl has argued that of the supposed backlog of 160,000 asylum cases, the govern-
ment has no intention of adjudicating 120,000. Most of these 120,000 cases concern undocumented 
Cubans and Haitians whose status will be regularized under pending congressional legislation. 
Aleinikoff also points out that the stock argument that "economic migrants" are making frivolous claims 
and thereby causing the backlog is unsupported. Three-quarters of the applications for asylum have 
been filed by individuals from Cuba, Iran, EI Salvador, Nicaragua, Poland, Afghanistan, the People's 
Republic of China, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, and Lebanon. Aleinikofl, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessonsfor the United States, 17 U. MICH.].L. REF. 183, 187, 191-92 
(1984). 
225. 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982), appeal denied, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982), modified, 
Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984). 
226. See, e.g.,]. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978); Vose, Litigation as a 
Form of Pressure Group Activity, reprinted in BORZOI READER ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1971); Burke, The 
Political Evolution of Interest Group Litigation, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 1980. 
227. This sentiment is also expressed in]. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 161 (1980). But see 
Sandalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 466 (1981), where the author observes: 
Id. 
Even aliens, who are excluded from formal participation in the political process, have varied 
opportunities to influence the political process and to enlist the support of others who identify 
with them or whose interests are intertwined with theirs. 
228. See generally D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971); E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE 
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1975). 
229. Martin, supra note 57. Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 
44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 (1983). 
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They differ on the question of the due process procedures that should be 
accorded an applicant for asylum. In Matthews v. Eldridge,230 the Supreme Court 
established a test balancing the private and governmental interests at stake in an 
official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the 
procedures used, and the probable value of other procedural safeguards. 231 Both 
Martin and Aleinikoff apply the Matthews v. Eldridge standard, but with different 
results. Martin argues that while the claimant's interest in obtaining asylum 
might always appear important, that factor is redundant, since the issue in 
asylum proceedings is the weight of the individual's interest itself. 232 In other 
words, the weight of the interest is unknown until the hearing is held. Aleinikoff 
holds the opposite view. He likens asylum to criminal proceedings in the sense 
that an erroneous decision will have disastrous results. 233 In one case an innocent 
person will be made to unduly suffer and in the other an individual will be sent 
back to his home country to face persecution. Aleinikoff's conclusion is sound. 
As discussed above, a more active judiciary in non-refugee alien matters is 
needed. In light of the particular difficulties in refugee matters, however, the 
need for judicial activism is even greater. 234 
Martin and Aleinikoff agree in supporting a greater role for the courts in the 
area of the suspension of deportation. 235 They argue that because of the political 
biases of immigration judges, 236 and the pressures exerted by INS district direc-
tors,237.courts must provide a counterbalance. 238 It is uncertain whether Martin 
and Aleinikoff are willing to offer a judicial counterbalance for other instances 
of INS bias. Such a result is dictated by the desperate need for fair procedures. 
Judicial activism, however, would probably result in a complete overhaul of the 
system. 239 
230. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
231. Id. at 348-49. 
232. Martin, supra note 57 at 22-23. 
233. Aleinikoff, supra note 229 at 248-52. 
234. See Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping US Immigration Policy 45 
No.2 LAW & CONT. PROBLS. 163, 182-85 (1982). 
235. See INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), discussed supra note 121. 
236. See Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,8 (1980). 
237. See D. MARTIN & T. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 24, at 66, where the authors contend: 
In a very real sense it is likely that he [Immigration judge] views his mission as consistent with, 
if not important to, the mission of the agency: that is, the efficient enforcement of the 
immigration laws. 
This claim is based on the fact that today's Immigration judges are frequently yesterday's INS law 
enforcers. See Matter of Exame, Board Immig. Appeals Interim Decision #2920. In Exame, the 
petitioner unsuccessfully sought to have the Immigration judge removed on the basis that the judge 
had formerly been an INS trial attorney and investigator in similar cases. See also Asylum Adjudication: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1981) (prepared statement of Anthony DeGaeto, President, Association of 
Immigration judges). An example of the partiality of Immigration judges is the role they played in the 
Haitian Program, which served as the basis for the lawsuit in Haitian Refugee Center. 
2118. Id. at 64-69. 
239. judicial activism might counteract many instances of INS bias: from the determination of who is 
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2. The Simpson/Mazzoli Bill 
This article has attempted to argue for a greater judicial role in immigration 
and refugee affairs. In this regard it is critical of current policy proposals. The 
Simpson/Mazzoli bill is a throwback to an earlier era in its attempts to narrow the 
courts role in immigration and refugee issues. As noted earlier, both versions of 
Simpson/Mazzoli would replace present day immigration judges with a system of 
administrative law judges, although the individuals serving in the new capacity 
might well remain the same. 240 In addition, the current Board of Immigration 
Appeals would be replaced by an independent United States Immigration 
Board. 241 These changes would constitute advances in terms of fair procedure. 
The role assigned to the judiciary, however, would be greatly diminished. Of the 
two bills, the House version envisions a less radical change. 242 The Senate bill, on 
the other hand, limits judicial review of asylum adjudications to the constitution-
ally guaranteed right of habeas corpus, and to those instances where the Attor-
ney General reverses or modifies a decision of the U.S. Immigration Board. 243 
a bona fide refugee, Hatian Refugee Center, 676 F.2d 1023, to the treatment of those claiming asylum 
status, id., Orantes-Hernandez, 541 F. Supp. 351; to the political considerations in the State Department's 
advisory opinions. See also J. CREWDSON, THE TARNISHED DOOR (1983). 
240. The House version calls for a retraining for Immigration Judges who will now become adminis-
trative law judges. This retraining is supposed to correct any previous biases. Section 124(a)(2), H.R. 
REp. 115, supra note 172, at 12. The Senate once held a different position. The version of Simpsoni 
Mazzoli that passed the Senate in 1982 stated: 
An individual who has served as a special inquiry officer under this title before the date of the 
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982 may not be designated to hear 
applications under this section. 
S. REp. No. 485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1982) S. 2222 § 208(a)(2). The version of Simpsoni Mazzo Ii that 
passed the Senate in 1983, however, allows for retraining. SEN. REP. 62, supra note 172, at 85 (citing S. 
529 § 208(a)(2». 
241. See H.R. REP. 115, supra note 172, at 52-53; SEN. REP. 62, supra note 172, at 35-36. 
242. The House Report is somewhat unclear, but it certainly provides a greater role for courts than 
the Senate version. 
The Committee Amendment sets forth the scope of review in asylum cases. First, the asylum 
applicant could challenge the jurisdiction of the administrative law judge or the U.S.l.B. which 
rendered the decision. Such a challenge could involve, for example, an allegation that the 
administrative law judge who conducted the proceeding was not specially trained in asylum 
matters .... Second, the alien could challenge the procedures by which the hearing was 
conducted on the ground, for example, that he was denied access to counsel. Third, the alien 
could challenge the legality or constitutionality of the statutes, rules, or regulations which 
governed the asylum process. Fourth, the alien could attack the determination on its merits, 
arguing that the determination was arbitrary or capricious. In this regard, it should be noted 
that the substantial evidence test would not apply. Of course, the U.S.l.B. and the courts 
should give great weight to any factual determinations or decision on the merits rendered by 
the administrative law judge. 
H.R. REP. 115, supra note 172, at 54-55. 
243. Compare the House Report, id., with the Senate Report: 
For all cases involving asylum, the bill provides for extensive administrative consideration, 
within the Justice Department but independent of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice .... Consistent with the practices of most other countries, there will be no right of further 
review on the issue of asylum .... Some persons have indicated concern that judicial review of 
asylum decisions of the United States Immigration Board will not be available unless the 
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Simpson/Mazzoli recognizes the biases and faults in the present V.S. immigra-
tion and refugee system, but it proposes that these biases and faults can be 
restrained or removed from the system by strengthening the administrative 
framework. Narrowingjudicial review of alien causes might, at first glance, have 
some merit, especially if one believes that courts are, or will be, swamped by a 
great number of asylum claims. 244 The analysis of this issue, however, should 
start with an examination of the judiciary's role in the system of government 
generally. Once the general principles are established, they can then be applied 
to the specific area of alien admissions. The analysis is faulty if it ignores the 
principles underlying judicial activism in other areas. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In general, courts have avoided activism and accorded deference to the politi-
cal branches in the area of alien admissions. Recently, however, some courts have 
allowed themselves a more active role, particularly in the area of refugee relief. 
The cor(!)non rationale for judicial deference in the context of alien admissions is 
that courts should not interfere with issues involving foreign relations. This 
article questions the connection between alien admissions and foreign policy. 
This article has attempted to argue that the occasional connection between 
foreign affairs and alien admissions has now been severed by the depoliticization 
of both avenues for admission. The fear of a renewed connection is insufficient 
grounds to support a general rule of judicial deference. Finally, it is argued that 
many judges have been both willing and competent to make straightforward 
determinations of conditions and activities in other countries. 245 
The courts have been able to avoid involvement in alien admission matters 
because the bias or unfairness in admission procedures has not been evident. It is 
a delusion to think that immigration and refugee issues can safely be left with the 
political branches and that they will provide fair solutions that reflect V.S. 
constitutional values. This article emphasizes the need for a more active role for 
the courts. The proposed Simpson/Mazzoli legislation, on the other hand, would 
substitute a strengthened administrative mechanism for the role currently 
Attorney General reverses or modifies the Board's decision .... It is true that a review will not 
be available comparable to that provided in INA section 106(a) for non-asylum deportation 
cases . ... 
SEN. REP. 62, supra note 172, at 12-13. The report goes on to observe that some general review could be 
provided through habeas corpus proceedings. Id. 
244. But see Aleinikoff, supra note 224. 
245. An analogous situation would be the evolving judicial role with regard to sovereign immunity. 
In 1976 the United States enacted into law the "restrictionist" view of sovereign immunity which allows 
other nations to be sued in U.S. courts for their commercial operations. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982). In 
addition, this same legislation vested sovereign immunity decisions exclusively with the courts them-
selves, and not the political branches. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12- 13, reprinted in 
1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6604, 6611-12. 
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played by some courts. It is often said that judicial involvement in public 
policy making interferes with the powers exercised by the political branches. 
Courts can play their role in making public policy by ensuring that the political 
branches follow the intent of existing legislation and our constitutional values. In 
this way, courts can contribute to fair and even-handed implementation of public 
policy in the immigration and refugee area. 
A larger question, related to this discussion, concerns the role courts should 
assume in matters that contain both domestic and international policy elements. 
Very little scholarly attention has been paid to this question, which will only grow 
in importance, as more matters contain both elements. The system of checks and 
balances should not be discarded, and judicial deference substituted, whenever a 
policy problem has international implications. 
